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Difference between revisions of "Moving sensitive files outside the web root"

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Can the same kind of security not be reached using a symlink on *nix systems? So you place the configuration.php above the webroot and place a symlink from the original position to the new place of the configuration.php?
 
Can the same kind of security not be reached using a symlink on *nix systems? So you place the configuration.php above the webroot and place a symlink from the original position to the new place of the configuration.php?
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== Symlinks defeat this. ==
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Normally, web servers will follow symlinks. (although this is configurable on most web servers.)
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If you move files out of the web root and make a symlink to them the files are still readable by the world.
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The advantage of moving read only files out of the web root and making a symbolic link to them is that it allows you to segment your auditing of your server, and allows things as simple as find -type f to locate all files to be audited after a suspected intrusion.
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Further more, symlinks can cause certain attacks to fail as they are based on assumptions that are not true.
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I am a big fan of symlinks, but they are no substitute for not allowing access to the files in question.

Revision as of 23:14, 22 March 2011

Using symlinks?

Can the same kind of security not be reached using a symlink on *nix systems? So you place the configuration.php above the webroot and place a symlink from the original position to the new place of the configuration.php?

Symlinks defeat this.[edit]

Normally, web servers will follow symlinks. (although this is configurable on most web servers.)

If you move files out of the web root and make a symlink to them the files are still readable by the world.

The advantage of moving read only files out of the web root and making a symbolic link to them is that it allows you to segment your auditing of your server, and allows things as simple as find -type f to locate all files to be audited after a suspected intrusion.

Further more, symlinks can cause certain attacks to fail as they are based on assumptions that are not true.

I am a big fan of symlinks, but they are no substitute for not allowing access to the files in question.